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Chapter 11
The FinTech Opportunity
Thomas Philippon

This chapter studies the FinTech movement in the context of the long run
evolution of the ﬁnance industry and its regulations. The 2007–09 ﬁnancial
crisis triggered new regulatory initiatives and accelerated existing ones.
I argue that the current framework has been useful, but it has run its course
and is unlikely to deliver signiﬁcant welfare gains in the future. If regulators
want to go further, they will need to consider alternative approaches to
involve FinTech.
FinTech covers digital innovations and technology-enabled business
model innovations in the ﬁnancial sector. Such innovations can disrupt
existing industry structures and blur industry boundaries, facilitate strategic disintermediation, revolutionize how existing ﬁrms create and deliver
products and services, provide new gateways for entrepreneurship, democratize access to ﬁnancial services, but also create signiﬁcant privacy, regulatory and law-enforcement challenges. Examples of innovations that are
central to FinTech today include cryptocurrencies and the blockchain,
new digital advisory and trading systems, artiﬁcial intelligence and
machine learning, peer-to-peer lending, equity crowdfunding, and mobile
payment systems.
The starting point of my analysis is that the current ﬁnancial system is
rather inefﬁcient. To show this, I update Philippon (2015) with post-crisis
US data and I show that the unit cost of ﬁnancial intermediation has
declined only marginally since the crisis. The evidence outside the US is
remarkably similar (Bazot 2017). Recent research also suggests that many
advanced economies have reached a point where ‘more ﬁnance’ is not
helpful.1 Signiﬁcant welfare gains from improvement in ﬁnancial services
are technologically feasible but unlikely to happen without entry of new
ﬁrms.
Next I review recent regulatory efforts and challenges. The ﬁnancial regulations enacted after 2009 are not as far reaching as the ones implemented
after the Great Depression, but the evidence suggests that these efforts have
made the ﬁnancial sector safer.2 A deﬁning feature of the current approach,
however, is that it focuses almost exclusively on incumbents. This approach is
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unlikely to deliver much further improvement because of ubiquitous ratchet
effects in leverage, size, and interconnectedness, preferential tax treatments,
and oligopoly rents. These distortions are embedded in the current ﬁnancial
system to such an extent that the political and coordination costs of removing
them have become prohibitive.
An alternative approach to ﬁnancial regulation isbased on the idea that
encouraging entry and shaping the development of new systems might be
the best way to solve the remaining challenges in ﬁnancial regulation. With
respect to incumbents, this alternative approach would be a form of containment: its goal would be to consolidate existing efforts, and prevent
future regulatory arbitrage, but not to impose top-down structural changes.
The new approach would focus on entrants and take advantage of the
ongoing development of FinTech ﬁrms. The main idea is to achieve
bottom-up structural change by encouraging, for instance, ﬁrms that provide transaction services without leverage, and trading systems that are
cheap, transparent and open-access. I conclude by sketching out some
guiding principles for this new approach.

Inefﬁciency of the Existing System
The unit cost of ﬁnancial intermediation in the US has stayed at around 2
percent for the past 130 years (Philippon 2015); Bazot (2017) ﬁnds similar
unit costs in other major countries (Germany, UK, France). Improvements
in information technologies have not been passed through to the end users
of ﬁnancial services. This section offers an update of this work, with two
goals in mind. First, measurement is difﬁcult and statistical agencies have
recently made some signiﬁcant data revisions to ﬁnancial accounts. We need
to know if these revisions affect the main insights of the original paper.
A second reason for updating the series is that the data in Philippon (2015)
predate the ﬁnancial crisis, so it is of interest to know how the unit cost of
intermediation has evolved since then. I then discuss recent trend in labor
compensation and employment. Finally, I discuss the evidence on the link
between ﬁnance and growth.
Financial expenses and intermediated assets. To organize the discussion
I use a simple model economy consisting of households, a non-ﬁnancial
business sector, and a ﬁnancial intermediation sector. The details of the
model are in the Appendix. The income share of ﬁnance, shown in
Figure 11.1, is deﬁned as3
yft Value Added of Finance Industry
:
¼
GDP
yt
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2020

Year…
Share of GDP

Intermediated Assets/GDP

Figure 11.1 Finance income and intermediated assets
Note: Both series are expressed as a share of GDP. Finance income is the domestic income of the
ﬁnance and insurance industries, i.e., aggregate income minus net exports. Intermediated
assets include debt and equity issued by non ﬁnancial ﬁrms, household debt, and various assets
providing liquidity services. Data range for intermediated assets is 1886–2012.
Source: Philippon (2015).

The model assumes that ﬁnancial services are produced under constant
f
returns to scale. The income of the ﬁnance industry yt is then given by
f

yt ¼ ψc;t bc;t þ ψm;t mt þ ψk;t kt ;

ð11:1Þ

where bc;t is consumer credit, mt are assets providing liquidity services, and kt
is the value of intermediated corporate assets. The parameters ψi;t ’ s are the
unit cost of intermediation, pinned down by the intermediation technology.
The model therefore says that the income of the ﬁnance industry is proportional to the quantity of intermediated assets, properly deﬁned. The model
predicts no income effect (i.e., no tendency for the ﬁnance income share to
grow with per-capita GDP). This does not mean that the ﬁnance income
share should be constant, since the ratio of assets to GDP can change. But it
says that the income share does not grow mechanically with total factor
productivity. This is consistent with the historical evidence.4
Measuring intermediated assets is complicated because these assets are
heterogeneous. As far as corporate ﬁnance is concerned, the model is
fundamentally a user cost model. Improvements in corporate ﬁnance
(a decrease in ψk ) lower the user cost of capital and increase the capital
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stock, which, from a theoretical perspective, should include all intangible
investments and should be measured at market value. A signiﬁcant part of the
growth of the ﬁnance industry over the past 30 years is linked to household
credit. The model provides a simple way to model household ﬁnance. The
model also incorporates liquidity services provided by speciﬁc liabilities (deposits, checking accounts, some form of repurchase agreements) issued by
ﬁnancial intermediaries. One can always write the RHS of (11.1) as
ψc;t ðbc;t þ

ψm;t
ψc;t

ψ

mt þ ψk;t kt Þ. Philippon (2015) ﬁnds that the ratios
c;t

ψm;t
ψc;t

and

ψk;t
ψc;t

are close to one.5 As a result one can deﬁne intermediated assets as:
qt  bc;t þ mt þ kt

ð11:2Þ

The principle is to measure the instruments on the balance sheets of nonﬁnancial users, households, and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This is the correct way
to do the accounting, rather than looking at the balance sheet of ﬁnancial
intermediaries. After aggregating the various types of credit, equity issuances, and liquid assets into one measure, I obtain the quantity of ﬁnancial
assets intermediated by the ﬁnancial sector for the non-ﬁnancial sector,
displayed in Figure 11.1.
Unit cost and quality adjustments. I can then divide the income of the
ﬁnance industry by the quantity of intermediated assets to obtain a measure
of the unit cost:
f

ψt 

yt
qt

ð11:3Þ

Figure 11.2 shows that this unit cost is around 2 percent and relatively stable
over time. In other words, I estimate that it costs two cents per year to create
and maintain one dollar of intermediated ﬁnancial asset. Equivalently,
the annual rate of return of savers is on average two percentage points
below the funding cost of borrowers. The updated series are similar to the
ones in the original paper. The unit costs for other countries are estimated
by Bazot (2017) who ﬁnds convergence to US levels.
The raw measure of Figure 11.2, however, does not take into account
changes in the characteristics of borrowers. These changes require quality
adjustments to the raw measure of intermediated assets. For instance, corporate ﬁnance involves issuing commercial paper for blue chip companies
as well as raising equity for high-technology start-ups. The monitoring
requirements per dollar intermediated are clearly different in these two
activities. Similarly, with household ﬁnance, it is more expensive to lend to
poor households than to wealthy ones, and relatively poor households have
gained access to credit in recent years.6 Measurement problems arise when
the mix of high- and low-quality borrowers changes over time.
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Raw Unit Costs
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Figure 11.2 Unit cost of ﬁnancial intermediation
Notes: The raw measure is the ratio of ﬁnance income to intermediated assets, displayed in
Figure 11.1. The 2012 data are from Philippon (2015), while the new data were accessed May
2016. Data range is 1886–2015.
Source: Philippon (2015) with updated data.

I then perform a quality adjustment to the intermediated assets series,
following Philippon (2015). Figure 11.3 shows the quality-adjusted unit cost
series. It is lower than the unadjusted series by construction, since quality
adjusted assets are (weakly) larger than raw intermediated assets. The gap
between the two series grows when there is entry of new ﬁrms, and/or when
there is credit expansion at the extensive margin (i.e., new borrowers). Even
with the adjusted series, however, we see no signiﬁcant decrease in the unit
cost of intermediation over time.
Finance has beneﬁted more than other industries from improvements in
information technologies. But unlike in retail trade, for instance, these
improvements have not been passed on as lower costs to the end users of
ﬁnancial services. Asset management services are still expensive. Banks
generate large spreads on deposits (Drechsler et al. 2017). Finance could
and should be much cheaper. In that respect, the puzzle is not that FinTech
is happening now. The puzzle is why it did not happen earlier.
Wages and employment. The relative wage in the ﬁnance industry is
deﬁned as
fin

relw ¼

w
t
w
 all
t

ð11:4Þ
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Unit Cost, with Quality Adjustment
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Figure 11.3 Unit cost and quality adjustment
Notes: The quality adjusted measure takes into account changes in ﬁrms’ and households’
characteristics. Data range is 1886–2015.
Source: Philippon (2015).

where w
 ; is the average wage (total compensation divided by total number of
employees). This measure does not control for changes in the composition
of the labor force within a sector (see Philippon and Reshef (2012) for
micro evidence on this issue). Figure 11.4 updates previous ﬁndings. One
can clearly see the high wages of the 1920s, the drop following the Great
Depression and WWII, and then a period of remarkably stability from 1945
to 1980. After 1980, the relative wage starts increasing again, in part because
low skill jobs are automated (ATMs) and in part because the ﬁnance
industry hires more brains.
There was some relative wage moderation following the 2007/2009 crisis,
but it was clearly limited. The labor share in ﬁnance has increased a bit
relative to the rest of the private sector (i.e., the proﬁt share has fallen a bit
more in ﬁnance), suggesting some moderation in the future, but the
changes are not large.
Figure 11.5 compares the employment dynamics in ﬁnance and other
industries over the past 25 years. It is quite striking to see that the ﬁnancial
crisis did not initially hit the ﬁnance industry more than the rest of the
economy. The main difference is the weaker recovery of employment in
ﬁnance from 2010 onward. Overall, ﬁnance has shrunk somewhat after the
crisis but nowhere near as much as after the Great Depression.
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Figure 11.4 Evolution of relative wage in ﬁnance vs. all industries
Notes: Wage in ﬁnance divided by average wage in all industries.
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Figure 11.5 Employment in ﬁnance vs. all industries
Notes: Employment is measured in millions of jobs.
Source: Philippon and Reshef (2012), updated.
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Source: Philippon and Reshef (2012), updated.
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Figure 11.6 Credit and growth, all vs. OECD countries
Source: Beck et al. (2011) dataset. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/
gfdr/data/ﬁnancial-structure-database (accessed March 25, 2019).

Finance and growth. There is a large literature studying the links between
ﬁnance and growth. Levine (2005) provides an authoritative survey, and
Levine (2014) a recent discussion. One main ﬁnding is displayed in the left
panel of Figure 11.6. Countries with deeper credit markets in 1960 (measured as credit outstanding over GDP) grew faster between 1960 and 1995.
It is also important to emphasize that the link between ﬁnance and (longterm) growth is not a mechanical consequence of credit expansion. As
Levine (2005) emphasized, the primary driver of the ﬁnance–growth
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nexus is the allocation of capital. Better ﬁnancial systems provide a better
allocation of capital, not necessarily more overall credit, as noted by Favara
(2009) and Cechetti and Kharroubi (2012), who argued that the relation
between credit and growth is not monotonic.7 One way to quickly see this is
to examine the same data for only the OECD countries. Among OECD
countries the link between credit and growth is not signiﬁcant, as can be
seen in the right panel of Figure 11.6.
Summary. Finance is important for growth, in particular for the allocation
of capital, but much of the recent growth of the ﬁnance industry had little
to do with efﬁcient capital allocation. Financial services remain expensive
and ﬁnancial innovations have not delivered signiﬁcant beneﬁts to consumers. The point is not that ﬁnance does not innovate: It does, yet these
innovations have not improved the overall efﬁciency of the system. This
is not a great theoretical puzzle: we know that innovations can be motivated
by rent seeking and business stealing, in which case the private and social
returns to innovation are fundamentally different. The race for speed is
an obvious example: there is a large difference between foreknowledge
and discovery in terms of social welfare, even though the two activities
can generate the same private returns (Hirshleifer 1971). This tension
between private and social returns exists in most industries, but economists
tend to think that entry and competition limit the severity of the resulting
inefﬁciencies.
Lack of entry and competition, however, has been an endemic problem in
ﬁnance in recent decades. Berger et al. (1999) review the evidence on
consolidation during the 1990s. The number of US banks and banking
organizations fell by almost 30 percent between 1988 and 1997, and the
share of total nationwide assets held by the largest eight banking organizations rose from 22.3 percent to 35.5 percent. Several hundred mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) occurred each year, including mega-mergers between
institutions with assets over $1 billion.8 The main motivations for
consolidation were market power and diversiﬁcation. Berger et al. (1999)
found little evidence of cost efﬁciency improvement, which is consistent
with Figure 11.5 and 11.3. De Young et al. (2009) showed that consolidation
continued during the 2000s. They argued that there was growing evidence
that consolidation is partly motivated by the desire to obtain too-big-to-fail
status, and that M&As have a negative impact on certain types of borrowers,
depositors, and other external stakeholders.
It is also important to keep in mind that the welfare implications of
ﬁnancial efﬁciency are signiﬁcant. In order to calculate welfare, we use a
simple model presented in the appendix. Figure 11.7 plots the welfare of
agents in the economy as a function of the unit cost of intermediation.
Welfare is measured in equivalent consumption units and normalized to
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Welfare

1.1
1.08

Consumption Equivalent
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0.03

Unit Cost of Intermediation

Figure 11.7 Welfare and the unit cost of intermediation
Notes: The welfare calculations are constructed using the model in the appendix. Welfare is
calculated as the amount of consumption agents would be willing to give up to reduce the unit
cost of intermediation.

one in the benchmark case of a unit cost of 2 percent. I have found that
agents in the economy would be willing to pay 8.7 percent of consumption
to bring the unit cost of intermediation down to 1 percent.
If one steps back, it is difﬁcult not to see ﬁnance as an industry with
excessive rents and poor overall efﬁciency. The puzzle is why this has
persisted for so long. There are several plausible explanations for this:
zero-sum games in trading activities, inefﬁcient regulations, barriers to
entry, increasing returns to size, etc.9 I will not attempt to disentangle all
these explanations. The important point for my argument is simpler: there
is (much) room for improvement. In the next section, I will argue that the
current regulatory approach is unlikely to bring these improvements.

A Perspective on Current Regulations
Rather than providing a comprehensive overview of recent ﬁnancial regulations, instead I make the case that the focus on incumbents inherent in
current regulations increases political economy and coordination costs.
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Recent achievements. Regulators have drawn several lessons from the 2008
disaster and tried to ﬁx the existing system, as is well summarized in Ingves
(2015). For instance, before the crisis, banking regulation was mostly based
on risk-weighted assets (RWA) ratios that were set quite low.
Today’s regulation is actually quite different:
(1) RWA ratios are signiﬁcantly higher;
(2) There are multiple metrics, including simple leverage, liquidity ratios, and counter-cyclical buffers;
(3) There are surcharges for Systemically important ﬁnancial institutions
(SIFIs), and systemic risk regulation extends beyond banking; and
(4) Regulators run rigorous stress tests and banks are required to write
living wills.
These regulations are a work in progress, and the path has not always
been straightforward. For example, European stress tests were poorly
designed in 2009 and became credible only in 2014. The new regulations are costly to sometimes complex, and it will be desirable to consolidate some of the measures and to streamline the reporting process.
But by and large, these regulations are here to stay, and some of the
complexity is by design. As Ingves (2015) argues, multiple metrics make
it harder for banks to game the system. Using several measures of risk is
also useful because different measures have different advantages and
drawbacks. For instance, RWA is better than simple leverage if we think
about arbitrage across asset classes at a point in time. On the other
hand, simple leverage is more counter-cyclical, as shown by Brei and
Gambacorta (2016).
This regulatory tightening, although not as ambitious as after the Great
Depression, has achieved several important goals. Capital requirements
have increased without adverse effects on funding costs (Cecchetti and
Schoenholtz 2014). For instance, EBA (2015) reports that the ‘common
equity tier 1’ (CET1) ratio of banks in the European Union increased by
1.7 percent between December 2013 and June 2015, with a 1.9 percent
increase in capital and about 0.1 percent increase in RWA. The banking
industry has become less risky, at least in developed economies.10
Nevertheless, some important goals remain elusive.
The leverage controversy. The most important regulatory debate following
the 2007–09 crisis revolves around the appropriate level of capital requirement for banks. Admati et al. (2011) argued for high capital ratios and
debunked several misleading claims about the supposed cost of such
requirements. In the end, capital ratios have been raised signiﬁcantly, but
not to the extent advocated by these authors. The bank leverage debate
illustrates an important pitfall of the current approach to ﬁnancial regulation. Almost everyone agrees that bank leverage was too high before the
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crisis, but agreeing on a new target capital ratio has proved more difﬁcult.
Countries have conﬂicting objectives, lobbies are powerful, and, perhaps
most importantly, we do not know what the ‘right’ ratio is because there
are several tradeoffs to consider. If the world had only commercial banks and
one global regulator, we would be able to estimate an optimal capital ratio,
and it would probably be rather high, for the reasons explained in Admati
and Hellwig (2013). But this is not our world. Regulators do not always
cooperate, jurisdictions compete and undermine each other, and we worry
about pushing activities away from the regulated banking sector. Regulatory
arbitrage is omnipresent and regulators are highly uncertain about when and
how it could happen. Finding the second-best (or third-best) optimal ratio
then becomes a daunting task. The information and coordination requirements of the current regulatory approach are prohibitive. I will argue in the
ﬁnal section of the chapter that another approach might be preferred.
Leverage is difﬁcult to measure. Regulating leverage is also particularly
difﬁcult because there are many ways for banks to take risks without increasing their ‘measured’ leverage. One example is the use of derivatives.
Figure 11.8, from Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2016), shows the impact of
5%
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Figure 11.8 Differences in leverage accounting and derivatives
Notes: Vertical axis is leverage (equity divided by assets) as measured by the GAAS minus
leverage as measured by the IFRS.
Source: Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2016), Leverage and Risk: http://www.moneyandbanking.
com (accessed March 3, 2019).
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Figure 11.9 Cost efﬁciency and size
Notes: Efﬁciency ratio is non-interest expense over (net interest income + non-interest income).
Source: Kovner et al. (2014).

netting on the size of balances sheets under two accounting standards.
GAAP allows more netting than IFRS. As a result, the equity equity-to-assets
ratio appears larger under GAAP than under IFRS. The difference between
the two measures is large for banks that are active in derivatives. This has a
material impact on ﬁnancial regulation, but it is difﬁcult to ﬁgure out the
true riskiness of these positions.
Banks want to be large and opaque. There are several reasons that banks
may want to be large. One reason is to achieve better cost efﬁciency, as
documented in Kovner et al. (2014) and presented in Figure 11.9. Other
reasons involve market power, political inﬂuence, and implicit guarantees.
Consistent with the TBTF idea, Santos (2014) found that the funding
advantage enjoyed by the largest banks was signiﬁcantly larger than that of
the largest non-banks and non-ﬁnancial corporations. As banks grow, they
take on more leverage and they become more opaque. Cetorelli et al.
(2014) considered the implications of increasing complexity for supervision
and resolution. Finally, implicit guarantees are not only a function of a
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bank’s individual size. Kelly et al. (2016) found evidence of collective government guarantees for the ﬁnancial sector.
G-SIFIs versus narrow banks. A formidable challenge for ﬁnancial regulation is to provide credible resolution mechanisms for global systemically
important ﬁnancial institutions (G-SIFIs). There are two fundamental difﬁculties. One comes from the sheer size and complexity of these organizations and the impossibility to forecast what would happen during a crisis.
A second issue is that there is little scope for learning and testing various
mechanisms because G-SIFIs do not usually fail for idiosyncratic reasons.
Living wills, total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements, are necessary, but in all likelihood they will not be properly battle-tested before a crisis
actually happens.
This has led several observers to argue for some form of ‘narrow banking.’
As Pennacchi (2012) explained, a narrow bank is a ﬁnancial ﬁrm that invests
in assets with little nominal risk and issues demandable liabilities. Depending
on how restrictive one’s deﬁnition is, narrow banking can range from money
market funds investing exclusively in Treasury Bills to commercial banks
which are restricted to back all their deposits with money market instruments
but can hold many other assets.11 Pennacchi (2012: 8) also noted that
‘recommendations for narrow banking appear most frequently following
major ﬁnancial crises.’ The crisis of 2008 was no exception. Chamley et al.
(2012) explained how limited-purpose banking could work, and Cochrane
(2014) proposed reforms to make the ﬁnancial system ‘run-proof.’
These are certainly powerful arguments in favor of narrow banking, but
there are also several counterarguments. The theoretical case is not as clearcut as some proponents argue. Wallace (1996) showed that narrow banking
negates liquidity risk sharing, in the sense that, in a Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) setup, any allocation under narrow banking can be achieved under
autarky. Another critique of the narrow banking proposal is that the joint
provision of demand deposits and loan commitments allows banks to diversify the use of liquidity Kashyap et al. (2002). Pennachi (2012), however,
argued that this synergy might in fact be a consequence of the insurance
provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Another major issue is that narrow banking would require powerful
regulators to implement a radical transformation of existing ﬁrms, and it
would also create incentives to move maturity transformation outside the
regulated system. Of course, the fact that an idea would be difﬁcult to
implement should not prevent us from studying its merits. As Zingales
(2015: 1355) argued, ‘when we engage in policy work we try to be relevant,’
and this can be a problem because it is easy to discredit good ideas by
labelling them politically unrealistic. Nevertheless, it does prompt reason
to thinking about different ways to reach the same goal.
Why a new strategy is needed. There is an apparent contradiction between
the widely shared diagnostic of the problems and the disagreements about
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how to address them. Essentially everyone agrees that leverage (especially
short-term leverage), opacity, and complexity were signiﬁcant contributors
to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09. It seems also clear that many large ﬁnancial
ﬁrms still enjoy too big to fail (TBTF) subsidies and oligopolistic rents. Yet, as
I have argued earlier, our tools and our understanding of how to use them
are limited; the problem is not so much that we do not know where we would
like to go, but that we do not know which path to follow.
Two factors are at the source of these difﬁculties. The ﬁrst is the complexity and depth of the distortions embedded in the current system: the tax
treatment of interest expenses, too-big-to-fail subsidies, oligopoly rents, and
much of the plumbing of the global ﬁnancial system. These distortions are
protected by powerful incumbents who beneﬁt directly and indirectly from
them (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Admati and Hellwig 2013). The bottom line
is that transforming incumbent ﬁnancial ﬁrms into safe and efﬁcient providers of ﬁnancial services is an uphill battle. At best, it will be long and costly,
and worst, it will simply not happen.
The second concern is that it is genuinely difﬁcult to design good regulations. When we think about systemic risk, for instance, there is always a
tension between regulating by entity and regulating by function. Regulating
by function is intellectually appealing, but it is technically challenging and
requires cooperation among many parties. By contrast, regulating by entity
is simpler but designating non-bank G-SIFIs creates legal challenges, as seen
recently in the case of MetLife. Tightening regulations is not only difﬁcult; it
can also be counter-productive. The most obvious risk is that of shifting
activities outside the regulated banking system. Another risk is to make
compliance costs prohibitive for would-be entrants. Finally, and most importantly, no one knows what a safe and efﬁcient ﬁnancial system should look
like. All we know is that the current one is expensive, risky, and dominated by
too-big-to-fail companies. Many proposals for wide-ranging structural change
would require unrealistic amounts of foresight by regulators.
The current regulatory approach, then, has reached its limits because of
political economy and coordination costs. If we could design the rules from
scratch, we would write them quite differently from what they are today. We
do not have this luxury for the legacy systems, but we surely could for the
new ones. My point is that it is a lot easier to create and maintain a simple
and transparent system, than it is to transform a complex and opaque system
into a simple and transparent one.

The FinTech Opportunity
Above I argued that the current approach to ﬁnancial regulation mostly
impose changes on existing ﬁrms. This section asks if the same regulatory
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goals could be achieved via a different approach, focused on new ﬁnancial
ﬁrms and systems. The alternative approach creates new challenges, but
I argue that it is likely to beneﬁt from the FinTech movement. This section is
therefore not a survey of current trends in FinTech. Instead, I highlight
instances where there is a tension between private incentives to innovate
and broad regulatory objectives.
Some speciﬁc features of FinTech. The FinTech movement shares some
features with all other movements of disruptive innovations, but it also has
some features that are speciﬁc to the ﬁnance industry. As in other industries,
FinTech startups propose disruptive innovations for the provision of speciﬁc
services. The key advantages of incumbents are their customer base, their
ability to forecast the evolution of the industry, and their knowledge of
existing regulations. The key advantage of startups is that they are not
held back by existing systems and are willing to make risky choices. In
banking, for instance, successive mergers have left many large banks with
layers of legacy technologies that are, at best, partly integrated (Kumar
2016). FinTech startups, by contrast, have a chance to build the right systems
from the start. Moreover, they share a culture of efﬁcient operational design
that many incumbents lack.
A feature more speciﬁc to the ﬁnance industry is the degree to which
incumbents rely on ﬁnancial leverage. As argued earlier, leverage is embedded in many ﬁnancial contracts and subsidized by several current regulations. This gives the illusion that leverage is everywhere needed to
operate an efﬁcient ﬁnancial system. Conceptually, one can think of leverage today as partly a feature and partly a bug. It is a feature, for instance,
when it is needed to provide incentives, as in Diamond and Rajan (2001). It
is a bug when it comes from bad design or regulatory arbitrage (as in ﬁxed
face value money market funds), or when it corresponds to an old feature
that could be replaced by better technology (as in some payment systems
discussed below). The issue, of course, is that it is difﬁcult to distinguish the
leverage-bug from the leverage-feature. FinTech startups can therefore help
for two reasons. First, they will show how far technology can go in providing
low-leverage solutions. Second, they are themselves funded with much more
equity than existing ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms.
An alternative approach to ﬁnancial regulation.Financial stability and access
to ﬁnancial services are often stated as two important goals of ﬁnancial
regulation. My goal is to explore whether an alternative approach to regulation can make progress toward these goals, speciﬁcally in many areas of
ﬁnance, as discussed by Yermack (2015) in the case of corporate governance. There is no reason to think, however, that these innovations will
automatically enhance stability or even access to services. If regulators
want FinTech to reduce the risks created by TBTF ﬁrms and high leverage,
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they must adapt the regulatory framework. This section discusses the challenges they are likely to face.
Challenge 1: Entry and level-playing ﬁeld. FinTech’s interests are not naturally aligned with regulators’ long term goals. That is, FinTech ﬁrms will
enter where they think they can make a proﬁt, but there are many regions of
the ﬁnancial system where incumbents are entrenched and entry is difﬁcult.
An example of a highly concentrated market is custody and securities
settlement. In theory, the blockchain technology could improve market
efﬁciency, but if there is no entry, this could simply increase incumbents’
rents. For instance, a restricted blockchain could be used by incumbents to
stiﬂe innovation. As successful ﬁrms grow large, they seek to alter the
political system to their advantage and increase the cost of entry. The
beneﬁciaries are open, competitive system often work to close the system
and stiﬂe competition (Rajan and Zingales 2003).
This highlights the complex issue of biased competition between entrants
and incumbents. Ensuring a level playing ﬁeld is a traditional goal of
regulation Darrolles (2016) discusses this idea in the context of FinTech
and argues, from a microeconomic perspective, that regulators should
indeed ensure a level playing ﬁeld. This line of argument, however, does
not readily apply to many of the distortions that plague the ﬁnance industry.
For instance, what does a level playing ﬁeld mean when incumbents are toobig-to-fail? Or when they rely excessively on short-term leverage? The level
playing ﬁeld argument applies when entrants are supposed to do the same
things as incumbents, only better and/or cheaper. But if the goal is to
change some structural features of the industry, then a strict application of
the level-playing-ﬁeld principle could be a hindrance.
The level-playing ﬁeld argument also sheds new light on some old debates
such as over capital requirements. In the past, incumbents have optimized
their use of implicit and explicit public subsidies and barriers to entry, and it
is costly to undo these distortions one by one.12 Regulators can, however,
prevent an erosion of the standards agreed upon after the crisis, and given
the various subsidies and advantages of debt, one can see capital
requirements as a way to reduce barriers to entry and foster a level-playing
ﬁeld. The substantial increase in bank capital that has occurred since the
crisis does not appear to have shifted activity from banks to shadow banks
(Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 2014).
Challenge 2: Leverage and history-dependence. Payment systems have been
an early target of FinTech ﬁrms, as noted by Rysman and Schuh (2016) who
review the literature on consumer payments and discuss three recent innovations: mobile payments, real-time payments, and digital currencies.
Mobile payments are already popular in Asia and parts of Africa, and faster
systems are often encouraged by central banks. These innovations are likely
to improve retail transactions, but they are unlikely to fundamentally change
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the payment system. In particular, they are unlikely to decrease its reliance
on short-term claims that are subject to runs.
We are used to thinking that many ﬁnancial services (payment among
others) require accounts with ﬁxed nominal values: the best examples are
retail deposits and checking accounts. This has been true for over 300 years
of banking history, but today’s technologies open new possibilities. We can
assess the value of many ﬁnancial assets in real time, and we can settle
payments (almost) instantly. Many transactions could therefore be cleared
using ﬂoating value accounts.13 Suppose buyer B and seller S agree on a
price p in units of currency. B and S can both verify with their smartphones
the value v of a ﬁnancial security (say a bond index fund). B can transfer p/v
units of the security to S to settle the transaction. S does not need to keep the
proceeds in the bond fund. S could immediately turn them into currency or
shares of a treasury bill fund. The point here is that new systems would not
need to rely on (ﬁxed nominal value) deposits like the old system did.
Deposit-like contracts create liquidity risk, and macro-ﬁnancial stability
would be enhanced if more transactions could be settled without them.
This was not technologically feasible a few years ago, but today it is, although
there are non-technological impediments, most notably with accounting
and taxes. Interestingly, in the ﬁeld of credit, we see that innovative
players such as Square propose loan contracts with repayments indexed
on sales, instead of ﬁxed coupons.
Another important point here is history-dependence. Regulations are
likely to be more effective if they are put in place early, when the industry
is young. A counter-factual history of the money market mutual fund industry can be used to motivate this idea. Suppose that regulators had decided in
the 1970s that, as a matter of principle, all mutual funds should use a
ﬂoating Net Asset Value. Such regulation would have been relatively
straightforward to implement when the industry was small, and it would
have guided market evolution and encouraged innovations consistent with
the basic principle. Now it is signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult to change regulation
when the industry has several trillion of dollars under management.
A challenge for regulators is then to be forward-looking when dealing with
FinTech. Effective regulation requires them to identify some basic features
they would like FinTech to have in 30 years, and mandate them now.
Challenge 3: Consumer protection. FinTech is likely to create new issues of
consumer protection, illustrated by example with robo-advisors for portfolio
management. An important issue for the industry is when and how investors
will ‘trust’ robots (Dhar 2016). Robo-advising will certainly create new legal
and operational issues, and it is likely to be a headache for consumer
protection agencies, as discussed in Baker and Dellaert (2019).
Yet if the goal is to protect consumers, robo-advising does not need to be
perfect: it only needs to be better than the current system. As well, it is
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important to keep in mind just how bad the track record of human advisors
has been. First, at an aggregate level, fees have not declined because, as
standard product became cheaper, customers were pushed into higher fee
products (Greenwood and Scharfstein 2013). Second, conﬂicts of interest
have been pervasive in the industry. For instance, Bergstresser et al. (2009)
found that broker-sold mutual funds delivered lower risk-adjusted returns,
even before subtracting distribution costs. Chalmers and Reuter (2012)
showed that broker client portfolios earned signiﬁcantly lower risk-adjusted
returns that matched portfolios based on target-date funds, but they offered
similar levels of risk. Broker clients allocated more dollars to higher fee
funds and participants tended to perform better when they did not have
access to brokers. Mullainathan et al. (2012) documented that advisers
failed to de-bias their clients and often reinforced biases that were not
their interest. Advisers encouraged returns-chasing behavior and pushed
for actively managed funds with higher fees, even if a client started with a
well-diversiﬁed, low-fee portfolio. Foà et al. (2015) found that banks were
able to affect customers’ mortgage choices not only by pricing but also
through and advice channel. Egan et al. (2016) showed that misconduct
was concentrated in ﬁrms with retail customers and in counties with low
education, elderly populations, and high incomes. They also documented
that the labor market penalties for misconduct were small.
So robo-advisors will have issues, but there is so much room for improvement that it should be easy for them to do better than human advisors, on
average. One can also make the case that a software program should be
easier to monitor than a human being. For instance, if the robo-advisor
contained a line of code that says: ‘if age>70 & education<High School, then
propose fund X,’ and X happens to be a high-fee actively managed fund,
then the meaning of the advice is clear. Any equivalent advice a human
advisor could give would certainly be much more ambiguous. Humans are
good at maintaining plausible deniability, and in the case of ﬁnancial advising, that’s a serious problem.

Conclusion
The goal of ﬁnancial regulation is to foster stability and access to services.
Accordingly, regulators should consider policies that promote low-leverage
technologies and the entry of new ﬁrms. This approach applied to FinTech,
can complement the current, incumbent-focused approach. It does not
require regulators to forecast which technology will succeed or which services should be unbundled (i.e., what the ‘ﬁnance-Uber’ or ‘ﬁnance-Airbnb’
would look like). It also does not require regulators to force top-down
structural changes onto powerful incumbents.
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Appendix: A Simple Model of Financial
Intermediation Accounting
In this Appendix I sketch a model, based on Philippon (2015), that can
be used for ﬁnancial intermediation accounting. The model economy consists of households, a non-ﬁnancial business sector, and a ﬁnancial intermediation sector. Long-term growth is driven by labor-augmenting
technological progress At ¼ ð1 þ γÞAt1 . In the benchmark model borrowers are homogenous, which allows a simple characterization of equilibrium intermediation.
I consider a setup with two types of households: some households are
inﬁnitely lived, the others belong to an overlapping generations structure.
Households in the model do not lend directly to one another. They
lend to intermediaries, and intermediaries lend to ﬁrms and to other
households.

Technology and Preferences
Long-lived households. Long-lived households (index l ) are pure savers.
They own the capital stock and have no labor endowment. Liquidity services
are modeled as money in the utility function. The households choose
consumption C and holdings of liquid assets M to maximize:

X
E

βt uðCt ; Mt Þ:

t0
ðC M v Þ1ρ 1

t
. As argued by Lucas
I specify the utility function as uðCt ; Mt Þ ¼ t 1ρ
(2000), these homothetic preferences are consistent with the absence of
trend in the ratio of real balances to income in US data, and the constant
relative risk aversion form is consistent with balanced growth. Let r be the
interest rate received by savers. The budget constraint becomes:

St þ Ct þ ψm;t Mt  ð1 þ rt ÞSt1 ;
where ψm is the price of liquidity services, and S are total savings. The Euler
equation of long lived households uC ðtÞ ¼ βE t ½ð1 þ rtþ1 ÞuC ðt þ 1Þ can then
be written as:
vð1ρÞ

Ml;t

ρ

vð1ρÞ

ρ

Cl;t ¼ βE t ½ð1 þ rðtþ1Þ ÞMl ;tþ1 Cl;tþ1 :

The liquidity demand equation uM ðtÞ ¼ ψm;t uC ðtÞ. is simply:
ψm;t Ml ;t ¼ vCl;t :
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Overlapping generations. The other households live for two periods and are
part of on overlapping generation structure. The young (index 1) have a labor
endowment η1 and the old (index 2) have a labor endowment η2 . We normalize
the labor supply to one: η1 þ η2 ¼ 1. The lifetime utility of a young household is
uðC1;t M1;t Þ þ βu ðC2;tþ1 ; M2;tþ1 Þ. I consider the case where they want to borrow
when they are young (i.e., η1 is small enough). In the ﬁrst period, its budget
constraint is C1;t þ ψm;t M1;t ¼ η1 W1;t þ ð1  ψc;t ÞBtc . The screening and monitoring cost is ψc;t per unit of borrowing. In the second period, the household
consumes C2;tþ1 þ ψm;tþ1 M2;tþ1 ¼ η2 Wtþ1  ð1 þ rtþ1 ÞBtc . The Euler equation
for OLG households is:
vð1ρÞ

ð1  ψc;t ÞM1;t

ρ

vð1ρÞ

ρ

C1;t ¼ βE t ½ð1 þ rtþ1 ÞM2;tþ1 C2;tþ1 :

Their liquidity demand is identical to the one of long-lived households.
Non-ﬁnancial business. Non-ﬁnancial output is produced under constant
returns technology, and for simplicity I assume that the production function
is Cobb-Douglass:10
F ðAt nt ; Kt Þ ¼ ðAt nt Þα Kt1α :
The capital stock Kt depreciates at rate δ, is owned by the households, and
must be intermediated. Let ψk;t be the unit price of corporate ﬁnancial
intermediation. Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms therefore solve the following program:
maxn;K F ðAt n; K Þ  ðrt þ δ þ ψk;t ÞK  Wt n. Capital demand equates the marginal product of capital to its user cost:


At nt α
ð1  αÞ
; ¼ rt þ δ þ ψk;t :
Kt
Similarly, labor demand equates the marginal product of labor to the real
wage:


At nt α1 Wt
;
¼
:
α
Kt
At
Financial intermediation. Philippon (2012) discusses in details the implications of various production functions for ﬁnancial services. When ﬁnancial
intermediaries explicitly hire capital and labor there is a feedback from
intermediation demand onto the real wage. This issue is not central here,
and I therefore assume that ﬁnancial services are produced from ﬁnal
goods with constant marginal costs. The income of ﬁnancial intermediaries is then:
f

Yt ¼ ψc;t Bc;t þ ψm;t Mt þ ψk;t Kt ;
where Bc;t ,Mt and Kt have been described above.
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Equilibrium comparative statics. An equilibrium in this economy is a
sequence for the various prices and quantities listed above such that households choose optimal levels of credit and liquidity, ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, and the labor and capital markets clear.
This implies nt ¼ 1 and
St ¼ Ktþ1 þ Btc .
Let us now characterize an equilibrium with constant productivity growth in
the non-ﬁnancial sector (γ) and constant efﬁciency of intermediation (ψ).
On the balanced growth path, M grows at the same rate as C . The Euler
equation for long-lived households becomes 1 ¼ βE t ½ð1 þ rtþ1 ÞðCCtþ1t Þvð1ρÞρ ,
so the equilibrium interest rate is simply pinned down by:
βð1 þ r Þ ¼ ð1 þ γÞθ ;
where θ  ρ  vð1  ρÞ: Let lower-case letters denote de-trended variables,
i.e. variables scaled by the current level of technology: for capital k  KAtt , for
C
consumption of agent ici  Ati;t , and for the productivity adjusted wage
w  Wt =At . Since n ¼ 1 in equilibrium, Equation (11.2) becomes:
kα ¼

1α
:
r þ δ þ ψk

Non-ﬁnancial GDP is y ¼ k 1α , and the real wage is:
w ¼ αk 1α ¼ αy:
Given the interest rate in (11.4), the Euler equation of short-lived households is simply:
1

c1 ¼ ð1  ψc Þθ c2 :
If ψc is 0, we have perfect consumption smoothing: c1 ¼ c2 (remember these
are de-trended consumptions). In addition, all agents have the same money
demand ψm mi ¼ vci . The budget constraints are therefore ð1 þ vÞc1 ¼ n1 w þ
1þr
ð1  ψc Þb and ð1 þ vÞc2 ¼ n2 w  1þγ
b. We can then use the Euler equations
and budget constraints to compute the borrowing of young households:
1

bc
ð1  ψc Þθ n2  n1
¼
:
w 1  ψ þ ð1  ψ Þ1θ 1þr
c
c 1þγ
Borrowing costs act as a tax on future labor income. If ψc is too high, no
borrowing takes place and the consumer credit market collapses. Household borrowing increases with the difference between current and future
income, captured by η1  η2 . Liquidity demand is:
m¼

vc
:
ψm
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and aggregate consumption is:
c¼


1 
w  ψc bc þ ðr  γÞk :
1þv

The comparative statics are straightforward. The ratios are constant along a
balanced growth path with constant intermediation technology, constant
demographics, and constant ﬁrms’ characteristics. Improvements in corporate ﬁnance increase y; w; k=y; c=y and m=y, but leave b c =y constant. Improvements in household ﬁnance increase b c =y, c=y and m=y, but do not
affect k. Increases in the demand for intermediation increase the ﬁnance
income share ∅ while supply shifts have an ambiguous impact.
v 1ρ

Þ
The utility ﬂow at time t is uðc; mÞ ¼ ðcm1ρ
and since m ¼ ψvc , we have:
m
 vð1ρÞ
v
c ð1þvÞð1ρÞ  1
ψm
:
uðc; mÞ ¼
1ρ

Imagine A ¼ 1 for simplicity. Then welfare for a particular generation is:
W ¼ uðc1 ; m1 Þ þ βu ðc2 ; m2 Þ þ
 vð1ρÞ
¼

v
ψm

1ρ

ω
uðc1 ; m1 Þ
1β



cl1θ
1
1θ
1θ
;
c1 þ βc2 þ ω

1ρ
1β

where ω is the Pareto weight on the long-lived agents.

Notes
1. See Favara (2009), Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Shin (2012) among others.
2. For instance, capital requirements are signiﬁcantly higher, but funding costs have
not increased (Cecchetti 2015). Of course, higher capital ratios could be desirable
(Admati et al. 2013).
3. Philippon (2015) discusses various issues of measurement. Conceptually, the best
measure is value added, which is the sum of proﬁts and wages. Whenever possible,
I therefore use the GDP share of the ﬁnance industry, i.e., the nominal value
added of the ﬁnance industry divided by the nominal GDP of the US economy.
One issue, however, is that before 1945 proﬁts are not always properly measured
and value added is not available. As an alternative measure I then use the labor
compensation share of the ﬁnance industry, i.e., the compensation of all employees of the ﬁnance industry divided by the compensation of all employees in the
US economy. Philippon (2015) also explains the robustness of the main ﬁndings
to large changes in government spending (because of wars), the rise of services
(ﬁnance as a share of services displays a similar pattern to the one presented
here), globalization (netting out imports and exports of ﬁnancial services).
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4. The fact that the ﬁnance share of GDP is the same in 1925 and in 1980 makes
is already clear that there is no mechanical relationship between GDP per
capita and the ﬁnance income share. Similarly, Bickenbach et al. (2009) show
that the income share of ﬁnance has remained remarkably constant in
Germany over the past 30 years. More precisely, using KLEMS for Europe
(see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)) one can see that the ﬁnance share in
Germany was 4.3 percent in 1980, 4.68 percent in 1990, 4.19 percent in 2000,
and 4.47 percent in 2006.
5. This is true most of the time, but not when quality adjustments are too large.
Philippon (2015) provides calibrated quality adjustments for the US ﬁnancial
system.
6. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, Moore and Palumbo (2010) document
that between 1989 and 2007 the fraction of households with positive debt balances
increases from 72 percent to 77 percent. This increase is concentrated at the
bottom of the income distribution. For households in the 0-40 percentiles
of income, the fraction with some debt outstanding goes from 53 percent to
61 percent between 1989 and 2007. In the mortgage market, Mayer and Pence
(2008) show that subprime originations account for 15 percent to 20 percent of all
HMDA originations in 2005.
7. It is also related to the issue of credit booms. Schularick and Taylor (2012)
document the risk involved in rapid credit expansions. This is not to say that all
credit booms are bad. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) ﬁnd only one-third of credit
booms end in a ﬁnancial crisis, while many booms are associated with ﬁnancial
reform and economic growth.
8. Banking M&As were part of a large wave. Nine of the ten largest M&As in US
history in any industry occurred during 1998 (Moore and Siems 1998). Of these
M&As, four occurred in banking (Citicorp-Travelers, BankAmerica-NationsBank,
Banc One-First Chicago and Norwest-Wells Fargo).
9. Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) provide an illuminating study of the growth of
modern ﬁnance in the US. They show that two activities account for most of this
growth over the past 30 years: asset management and the provision of household
credit. For asset management, they uncover an important stylized fact: individual
fees have typically declined but the allocation of assets has shifted toward high fee
managers in such a way that the average fee per dollar of assets under management has remained roughly constant. In Glode et al. (2010), an ‘arms race’ can
occur as agents try to protect themselves from opportunistic behavior by (over)investing in ﬁnancial expertise. In Bolton et al. (2016), cream skimming in one
market lowers assets quality in the other market and allows ﬁnancial ﬁrms to
extract excessive rents. In Pagnotta and Philippon (2018) there can be excessive
investment in trading speed because speed allows trading venues to differentiate
and charge higher prices. Gennaioli et al. (2014) propose an alternative interpretation for the relatively high cost of ﬁnancial intermediation. In their model,
trusted intermediaries increase the risk tolerance of investors, allowing them to
earn higher returns. Because trust is a scarce resource, improvements in information technology do not necessarily lead to a lower unit cost.
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10. See for instance the real time value of the Systemic Risk Measure of Acharya et al.
(2017) at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu (accessed March 3, 2019).
11. Narrow banking has deep historical roots. The evidence suggests that, prior to
the twentieth century, British and American banks lent mostly short term. Early
American banks did not offer long-term loans. According to Bodenhorn (2000),
banks made short-term loans that early manufacturing ﬁrms used to ﬁnance
inventories and pay rents and wages. According to Summers (1975: 1), ‘the
practice of guaranteeing future credit availability has existed since the beginning
of banking in the United States,’ but ‘it has only been since the mid-1960’s that
the topic of commercial bank loan commitment policies has become an explicit
issue in banking circles.’
12. In addition, as Barker and Wurgler (2015) argue, leverage can be rewarded by
institutional investors who like to lever up but who are precluded by charter or
regulation.
13. This possibility was recognized by Samuelson (1947: 123) ‘in a world involving no
transaction friction and no uncertainty . . . securities themselves would circulate
as money and be acceptable in transactions . . . ’ and discussed in Tobin (1958).
I thank Kim Schoenholtz for these references.
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